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The 34th Sir Frederick Bartlett Lecture
The abstract representations in speech processing
Anne Cutler
Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, Nijmegen, The Netherlands, and MARCS Auditory Laboratories,
University of Western Sydney, Australia
Speech processing by human listeners derives meaning from acoustic input via intermediate steps
involving abstract representations of what has been heard. Recent results from several lines of research
are here brought together to shed light on the nature and role of these representations. In spoken-
word recognition, representations of phonological form and of conceptual content are dissociable.
This follows from the independence of patterns of priming for a word’s form and its meaning. The
nature of the phonological-form representations is determined not only by acoustic-phonetic input
but also by other sources of information, including metalinguistic knowledge. This follows from evi-
dence that listeners can store two forms as different without showing any evidence of being able to
detect the difference in question when they listen to speech. The lexical representations are in turn
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separate from prelexical representations, which are also abstract in nature. This follows from evidence
that perceptual learning about speaker-specific phoneme realization, induced on the basis of a few
words, generalizes across the whole lexicon to inform the recognition of all words containing the
same phoneme. The efficiency of human speech processing has its basis in the rapid execution of
operations over abstract representations.
Keywords: Speech processing; Phonemes; Lexicon; Representations.
Humans with unimpaired hearing extract mean-
ingful information from acoustic input in countless
ways. Their behaviour shows it—the leap out of
the way on hearing a car approaching from
behind, the sigh of relief as a letter falls into a
still-full postbox, the grimace at the sound of
breaking glass from the kitchen. Animals extract
meaning from acoustic signals too, and it has
recently become clear that their processing can
extend beyond a simple associative mapping,
such as from stimulus to threat or reward;
animals of many species can derive meaning by
inference beyond the actual form of an acoustic
input (Arnold & Zuberbu¨hler, 2006; Kaminski,
Call, & Fischer, 2004). But, incontrovertibly, all
of the above examples concern processing of a far
simpler nature than communication by speech.
Processing speech turns an acoustic signal into
meaning via a number of intermediate steps,
with intermediate representations at each level of
processing. This paper describes some recent
advances in our knowledge of the nature of and
interrelationships between these representations.
It is an interesting time to be working on speech
processing by human listeners. Research in this area
has traditionally been divided between two disci-
plines. Speech perception has been studied by pho-
neticians, who determine how acoustic evidence in
a speech signal motivates listeners’ decisions about
which speech sounds (phonemes) the signal con-
tains. Word recognition and the comprehension
of sentences and discourse have been the domain
of psycholinguistics. Neither discipline strives for
a complete model of speech processing.
Psycholinguists largely take the “front end”—the
initial processing applied to raw acoustic input—
for granted, assuming that it will deliver a represen-
tation of the input that is in a form suitable for
accessing stored lexical entities. In the 1970s, and
to a lesser extent in the 1980s, psycholinguists ener-
getically debated the “units of perception”—
namely, the form of these representations that are
suitable for accessing a lexicon. They never then
debated about whether any such prelexical level
existed. Now, however, they do, and the result has
been an unprecedented convergence; the two tra-
ditionally separate domains of speech perception
research have begun to overlap, since it is only by
simultaneous attention to both domains that
current theoretical issues can be decided. Thus, in
recent years phoneticians have come to take word
recognition into account, and psycholinguists have
become more sensitive to the nature of speech. A
central issue of joint attention has become the rep-
resentations, both prelexical and lexical, involved in
speech processing: whether these representations
are abstract or are accumulated traces of
episodes of experience; if they are abstract, how
many different kinds of representation there are;
and where (at which levels of processing) they
play a perceptual role.
Questions of representation permeate the theo-
rizing in speech perception research. An overview
of the field’s research programme would include:
determining what processing is involved in under-
standing a spoken utterance, establishing what
parts of this processing are specific to spoken
language (but not other auditory signals such as
the sound of the car or of the letter falling into
the box), and then—vital for the psycholin-
guist—distinguishing the parts that are universal
across languages versus the parts that are subject
to language-specific influence. These questions
concern the stages of processing and the nature
of the processes at each stage. There are then
also issues concerning the relationship between
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stages: that is, the flow of information—whether
processes at a given stage receive input from a
single direction or bidirectionally, for instance.
As in most areas of cognitive psychology, this
last issue is a hotly debated one (see, for example,
Norris, McQueen, & Cutler, 2000, and the
commentaries it evoked; or McClelland, Mirman, &
Holt, 2006, and McQueen, Norris, & Cutler,
2006b). In publications of the field these central
issues—universality versus language specificity in the
nature of the processes, and unidirectionality versus
bidirectionality in the relationship between the
processes—unquestionably play a major role. But the
nature and form of the representations upon which
speech perception processes operate also play a role
in all these debates. Sometimes this role is implicit,
but there is no way to take a theoretical stance
without committing to a position on representational
issues. No explanation without representation!
The following sections of this paper describe
recent evidence that constrains the prelexical and
lexical components of speech-processing models
with respect to the nature and form of the rep-
resentations involved. This evidence motivates
the conclusions that spoken-word recognition
involves separate lexical representations of word
form and word meaning, and that the former (pho-
nological representations) can be activated without
necessary consequent activation of the latter (con-
ceptual representations); that the phonological rep-
resentations are not entirely and solely constrained
by the output of prelexical processing; and that pre-
lexical and lexical representations are separate and,
in both cases, abstract.
Separate lexical representations of word form
and word meaning
Words have meaning, which is arguably constant
whether words are spoken, heard, or written.
Across speaking, listening, and reading, however,
the form of words differs—respectively, one and
the same meaning is encoded by articulatory,
acoustic, and orthographic forms. Models of
lexical processing must stipulate the relationship
between the representations of form and the rep-
resentations of meaning. Psycholinguists who
have built models of lexical access in speech pro-
duction (e.g., Dell, 1988; Levelt, Roelofs, &
Meyer, 1999) have found it necessary to formally
separate the conceptual representations activated
to express a chosen meaning from the phonologi-
cal representations that contact the articulatory
output mechanisms. Evidence for the separation
of these two types of representation comes inter
alia from frequency effects on speech production.
If form and meaning representations were necess-
arily linked, then the frequency of the meaning
should govern ease of access to the form. A hare
and a swan, very similar in frequency, should be
equally easy to name, and it should not matter
that the name hare has a homophone hair with a
much higher frequency. But it does matter; the
naming time is determined by the highest fre-
quency homophone (Dell, 1990; Jescheniak &
Levelt, 1994).
In speech comprehension, evidence on this
issue is harder to come by; a homophonous
spoken form may be held to activate two lexical
entries that are phonologically identical without
this requiring separation between the phonological
and conceptual components of each entry. Some
models of lexical access in comprehension have
indeed explicitly proposed that access to a word’s
form entails access to the word’s meaning (e.g.,
Gaskell & Marslen-Wilson, 1997). In this
section, however, evidence is presented from a
series of experiments contrasting priming of
semantically associated words with priming of
phonological form; this evidence motivates the
claim that the recognition of spoken words, like
word production, draws on formally dissociable
phonological and conceptual representations.
The experiments made use of two alternative
versions of a single task: cross-modal priming.
This task measures the effects of an immediately
preceding heard prime on lexical decision
responses to a visual target string. Presented with
the letter string RIGHT, English-speakers
should respond yes: It is a word. Do they do this
faster after hearing the word wrong than after
hearing an unrelated control word—for example,
soon? If so, then we assume that processing of
the lexical representation of wrong has facilitated
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processing of the lexical representation of right—
in this case because there is a relationship of
meaning between the two words. If in an exper-
iment the related primes and targets share such a
relationship of meaning, we refer to associative
priming. But primes and targets do not have to
be related in meaning, because cross-modal
priming also has an identity-priming variant. In
identity priming, effects of the prime wrong
might be assessed on lexical decisions to the
target WRONG. It is clear that priming in this
case should be very strong; reading a word just
after hearing exactly the same word spoken
should be much easier than reading it after
hearing some other word.
These two versions of the cross-modal priming
task allow us to use the task to probe the activation
of the components of lexical representations.
Briefly: If spoken wrong facilitates responses to
WRONG, then at the very least the phonological
form of the prime word has been activated. If
spoken wrong facilitates responses to RIGHT,
then at the very least the prime’s conceptual rep-
resentation has been activated. The relative acti-
vation patterns of the two types of representation
can be compared, enabling researchers to ask
such questions as whether activation of the one
representation irrevocably entails activation of
the other, or whether activation of the one rep-
resentation necessarily precedes activation of the
other.
Furthermore, we can ask these questions with
respect to the simple relationship between the
prime and target words (e.g., with the prime
word presented in isolation), or with the prime
word occurring in a wider sentence context, or
even with the prime word occurring, as it were,
by accident. Words occur by accident all the
time. This is just an inevitable consequence of con-
structing a vocabulary of hundreds of thousands of
words out of only a few dozen phonemes—the
words cannot all be unique sequences, and
especially long words will tend to contain short
words as accidental embeddings (you in unique,
seek in sequence, axe and dent and dental in acciden-
tal—every sentence contains a wealth of
examples).
The issue for the spoken-word recognition
researcher is the role of such accidentally present
words in the recognition of the words that are
intentionally present in the speech input. We are
often not consciously aware of the accidental
words, though sometimes our attention may be
drawn to them. Some years ago, for instance, a
Cambridge Evening News fashion feature sported
the headline “Sarong—so right”; the writer who
chose the headline capitalized on the fact that
every time we hear the word sarong we hear
within it all the phonemic evidence necessary to
support the word wrong. Puns often exploit
embedding in this way, and the fact that writers
and speakers make such puns means that we
are not always oblivious to the spurious occur-
rences of words such as wrong in sarong. But
does hearing sarong necessarily activate the phono-
logical representation of wrong? And does it,
further, activate the conceptual representation of
wrong?
In a series of experiments this string of related
questions was put to the test by Norris, Cutler,
McQueen, and Butterfield (2006b). Their study
included all possible combinations of the two
forms of the word (intended: wrong versus acci-
dental: sarong), the two forms of the task (identity
priming versus associate priming), and two types
of context (none, i.e., isolated-word presentation,
versus sentence contexts). Prime words such as
wrong were thus presented in isolation, were pre-
sented accidentally embedded in carrier words
(sarong), or were contained in sentence contexts,
which again could be for either the word itself
(They were surprised to learn that the wrong costumes
had been ordered) or for its carrier word (They were
surprised to learn that sarong costumes had been
ordered). The effect of all of these different types
of prime was measured on recognition of visually
presented target words, which could be the
word itself (WRONG) or a conceptually related
associate (RIGHT).
The results clearly showed that phonolo-
gical activation and conceptual activation can
dissociate. In Norris et al.’s (2006b) experiments,
wrong in isolation facilitated recognition of both
WRONG and RIGHT, but wrong in a sentence
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context facilitated only recognition of WRONG,
not of RIGHT. The prime sarong never had any
perceptible effect on recognition of RIGHT, but
exercised inhibitory effects on recognition of
WRONG, especially when it occurred in a sen-
tence context. Figure 1 summarizes the results,
expressed as priming effects, across the experiment
series.
Thus phonological activation is robust. When we
hear wrong, the appropriate phonological represen-
tation is activated. This is true when we hear
wrong in isolation and when we hear wrong in a sen-
tence, and it also occurs when we hear wrong acci-
dentally embedded—for example, in sarong. In the
latter case, activation is indirectly measurable via
the consequent inhibition. In all well-known
current models of spoken-word recognition (e.g.,
Gaskell & Marslen-Wilson, 1997; McClelland &
Elman, 1986; Norris, 1994), recognition is
assumed to occur via a process of competition
between multiple concurrently activated lexical can-
didates, which are fully or partially supported by the
speech input; the more support a candidate word
receives, the more it is able to inhibit competing
words and thereby eventually win the competition.
Inhibition is the sign that a candidate was activated,
but lost out to a rival word in the competition
process. When sarong is heard, sarong wins, but to
win it has had to suppress activation of wrong,
which was also competing.
Figure 1. Effects of cross-modal priming by spoken prime words such as wrong, expressed as difference in reaction time from a control
condition with a different, unrelated prime, separately for visual target words such as WRONG (identity priming) and RIGHT
(associate priming). In the upper figures, the prime was the intended word (wrong); in the lower figures, it was accidentally present
(wrong in sarong); in the left figures, the prime was spoken in isolation (wrong, sarong); in the right figures, it was spoken in a
sentence context. Based on results from Norris et al. (2006b).
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In contrast to phonological activation, concep-
tual activation is less robust (or at least less
independent). When we hear the word wrong
uttered in isolation, its associated conceptual rep-
resentation is strongly enough activated for an
effect to be observed on recognition of the concep-
tual associate RIGHT. But when we hear wrong
by accident, embedded in sarong, no detectable
conceptual activation spreads to RIGHT. This
holds when sarong occurs in a sentence and also
when it is spoken in isolation. And even when
we hear the word wrong itself in a sentence, there
is not necessarily any conceptual activation either.
This last result was somewhat puzzling given
that many previous studies, from Swinney (1979)
onwards, had shown significant cross-modal
associate priming from words in sentences.
Norris et al. (2006b) further explored this aspect
of their results and discovered that spoken wrong
in a sentence produced significant priming for
RIGHT if the sentence contexts were truncated
immediately after the occurrence of the critical
prime word (They were surprised to learn that the
wrong –), or if the sentences contained contrastive
accents (which effectively called up a discourse
context in which the sentence could be placed).
These conditions, or their equivalents, such as
primes in sentence-final position, had been met
in a large proportion of the published associate-
priming studies with significant results. Thus the
conceptual activation of an individual word is
dependent on the conceptual activation of the
whole context in which it occurs. A word in iso-
lation may act as its own effective context, allowing
activation of its full semantics, but a word in a sen-
tence is constrained by the sentence context and
the conceptual contribution it makes there.
Although these results thus also illuminate the
relationship between word and sentence meaning,
the principal finding for present purposes is the
dissociation between the identity-priming and
associate-priming situations. The implication of
this dissociation is the separability of a word’s pho-
nological and conceptual representations. Effects
arising in the identity-priming version of the
cross-modal priming task reflect phonological
activation consequent upon any occurrence of the
word form, intended or not. Such effects have no
necessary implications for conceptual activation
(e.g., the rapidly inhibited activation of spuriously
present embedded words appears to concern their
phonological form alone). Effects in the associ-
ate-priming situation do not constitute a touch-
stone for activation of any kind, but are
dependent on activation of lexical semantics,
which may or may not accompany activation of
phonological form. The one priming effect thus
cannot be predicted from the other. A simple
unitary model of lexical entries, in which phonolo-
gical and conceptual representations are inextricably
united, is therefore untenable; the recognition
lexicon contains separate and independently func-
tioning representations of form and of meaning.
Phonological representations and where they
come from
Consider now the phonological representations,
which, as Norris et al.’s cross-modal priming evi-
dence attests, constitute the primary contact
between speech input and the lexicon. Hearing
speech causes phonological representations to
become active and enter the competition process
described above. Each separate known form has
a distinct stored representation; whenever we
learn a new word, we have to construct a phonolo-
gical representation and store it, if we want to
recognize the word when we hear it again. Thus,
many speakers of English acquired a new lexical
representation when bling entered the language a
few years ago. The process of learning a new pho-
nological form and creating a corresponding lexical
entry rarely causes problems in the native
language, though adult foreign-language learners
are aware that the process can be effortful. At
issue in this section is the relationship between
phonological representations in the lexicon
and the prelexical representations computed
during the processing of speech. It is easy to
assume that the former will be entirely determined
by the latter. If we hear two forms as distinct, and
thus derive distinct prelexical representations for
them, then their lexical forms will also be different;
but if we hear them as indistinguishable they will
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be assigned identical phonological representations
prelexically, and hence the representations in the
lexicon should also be identical. But it appears
that this simple state of affairs does not hold.
The phonological representations in the lexicon
are abstract and can be codetermined by other
sources of knowledge than our prelexical phonetic
perceptions.
Second-language (L2) learning offers a useful
window onto the relationship between prelexical
and lexical processing. In the first language (L1),
at least the very earliest stages of word learning
in infancy must be fully dependent on the input;
but in an L2, even the initial acquaintance with
phonological form can be influenced by other
sources of information as well as by the nature of
the input. L2 learners already have an L1, for
example; this means they have a set of phonemic
categories that may help or hinder the formation
of the correct set of categories for interpreting
speech in the L2. They also have a good deal of
knowledge about how words are structured pho-
nologically, and, again, this can be helpful or
unhelpful to the extent that the L1 and L2 do or
do not match. An L1 that uses stress to distinguish
words may hinder acquisition of an L2 that uses
lexical tone; an L1 that does without articles
before nouns may make acquisition of article use
in an L2 very hard. Beyond the phonological
mapping between the L1 and the L2, the adult
learner brings many abstract expectations to the
language-learning task: expectations about how
different types of concepts are represented by
nouns and verbs, for instance, or about how
language can be used in different communicative
situations. Finally, the L2 learner can receive
explicit instruction, either formally from a
teacher, or less formally, for example from work-
mates, and can draw on orthographic represen-
tations of new forms as well as spoken input. L2
learners exploit every type of help they can get
with the language-learning task, and one result is
that they set up phonological representations in
the lexicon that include information that they
have not extracted from the input.
This conclusion is supported by results from a
series of L2 spoken-word recognition experiments,
using a sensitive task which can examine the
process of recognition moment by moment as
the speech input constituting the target word
unfolds. In this task, participants wear a
head-mounted camera, by means of which the
gaze direction of their eyes can be tracked
(see Tanenhaus & Spivey-Knowlton, 1996).
Typically, the participants are presented with a
computer display containing several objects and
are asked to carry out simple operations involving
these objects, using the computer mouse. Their
eye movements show that they actively consider
alternative options for what the speech input
could turn out to be and allow the incoming
speech to modulate these options in a continuous
manner. Thus if the display contained, for
example, a camel, a corkscrew, a candle, and a
frog, the very beginning of the frication noise for
the initial /f/ of frog would be enough for listeners
to select the frog, whereas the stop consonant with
which the other three names begin would be
enough to rule out the frog. If the stop consonant
were followed by the vowel /æ/ of camel and
candle, the corkscrew would then likewise be
ruled out. But importantly, listeners do not just
wait passively for the input to determine unam-
biguously what the target is—the task works so
well for psycholinguistic purposes because alterna-
tives that are still possible receive a significant pro-
portion of looks, up to the moment at which the
disambiguating further information arrives.
Given the first two phonemes of camel and
candle, both of the pictures will receive some
looks until the nature of the following nasal
phoneme supports one and disfavours the other.
Thus the task allows us to observe phonetic pro-
cessing for word recognition in a continuous
manner; it allows us to see how the listener
selects the correct word and what alternatives are
considered (alternatives from the response selec-
tion set, of course, but potentially also alternatives
in the vocabulary as a whole; Magnuson, Dixon,
Tanenhaus, & Aslin, 2007).
Available candidates under active consideration
as speech is heard can differ for L2 versus L1 lis-
teners, if the L2 listeners’ phonetic processing
differs from the native norm. Presented with a
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display containing a panda and a pencil and a duck
and a strawberry, for example, and instructed in
English to click on the panda, Dutch speakers of
English as an L2 are very likely to look first at
the pencil instead of at the panda (Weber &
Cutler, 2004). This happens because Dutch listen-
ers find it hard to distinguish the English vowel
contrast exemplified in pan- versus pen-. Dutch
has only one vowel in this area of the vowel
space, and it is identical to neither of the English
vowels but falls somewhere between them
(though in broad phonetic transcription it is
assigned the same representation as the vowel in
English pen). Thus the Dutch category can
capture both of the English vowels, making the
distinction the hardest kind for an L2 learner to
acquire (Best, 1995).
Figure 2 compares the looking pattern to (a) the
target pictures (e.g., the panda) and (b) the compe-
titor pictures (e.g., the pencil) for, in each case,
Dutch participants and a control group of British
English participants (the 10% or so of looks with
which each group favoured the other two distractor
items in the display are not shown in these figures).
Across time, starting in these graphs from the onset
of the spoken target word, the English participants
look more rapidly to the correct target and away
from the competitor, while the Dutch clearly look
significantly more at the competitor item with a
confusable vowel, and their looks to the correct
target start to come in later.
This pattern would be consistent with an
account in which the initial syllables of panda
and pencil are totally indistinguishable in the
Dutch listeners’ prelexical phonetic processing of
the input, and the stored phonological represen-
tations of the two words at the lexical level in con-
sequence have identical initial syllables. This in
turn would predict reversibility of the pattern. If
the listeners simply cannot tell the difference, so
that pan- and pen- are represented as homophonic
in their lexicons just as sale and sail would have to
be, then each form should be confused with the
other. Instructed to click on the pencil, they
should be quite likely to look at the panda initially
instead.
But in fact this does not happen. Figure 3
shows the pattern that results when Dutch listen-
ers hear click on the pencil—they obediently look at
the pencil and do not appear to be tempted to look
Figure 2. Eye-tracking data for Dutch and British English listeners given spoken instructions such as click on the panda and a visual display
containing inter alia a panda and a pencil; fixation proportions across time for (a) the target picture (panda), and (b) the competitor picture
(pencil). Based on results from Weber and Cutler (2004).
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towards the picture of the panda at all. Thus the
confusability they suffer from is asymmetrical;
pan- could be either pan- or pen-, but pen- seems
to be unambiguously pen-.
This happens not only with this vowel contrast
for Dutch listeners to English, but also with the
most widely studied second-language phonetic
confusion, English /r/-/l/ for Japanese listeners.
Results from a similar experiment by Cutler,
Weber, and Otake (2006) are summarized in
Figure 4. In Figure 4a, Japanese listeners
instructed to click on a picture of a rocket experi-
ence noticeable extended competition (until at
least 700 ms after target onset) from a picture of
a locker, but in Figure 4b, listeners from the
same group instructed to click on a picture of a
locker look at it more rapidly and look less (from
400 ms after target onset) towards the alternative
competitor picture (the rocket).
In both cases, then, the two L2 phoneme cat-
egories are not treated as equivalent; one of them
is dominant. For the Dutch listeners, it is the
vowel /E/ as in pen; whether they hear pan- or
pen-, they interpret it by preference as pen-. For
the Japanese listeners, it is /l/; whether they hear
lock- or rock-, they tend to interpret it as lock-.
This is easily explicable in terms of closeness to
the L1 category; the single Dutch vowel may
fall between the two English vowels, but it is
classified in the International Phonetic Alphabet
(IPA) as /E/, and English /E/ is indeed a better
match to it than English /{/ is. Dutch listeners
to English identify noise-masked syllables with
/{/ more often as /E/ than vice versa, although
English native listeners do not show such an asym-
metry (Cutler, Weber, Smits, & Cooper, 2004).
The single Japanese consonant that is closest to
English /r/ and /l/ is represented by the letter r
in transliterated words (e.g., tempura, Hiroshima,
harikiri), but is articulatorily closer to /l/, being
made with the tongue against the palate as /l/
is. When Japanese listeners are asked to rate
English syllables on goodness of fit to Japanese syl-
lables, they accord higher ratings to syllables with
/l/ than to syllables with /r/ (Iverson et al., 2003;
Takagi, 1995).
Thus in both cases there is a tendency for the
percept to be classified as the dominant (most
L1-like) category, whichever of the two L2 cat-
egories has actually been heard in the input. At
the perceptual level, the L2 listeners are clearly
not displaying accurate discrimination. At the
lexical level, however, a quite different situation
obtains: The way the undiscriminated percept is
mapped to the lexicon is surprisingly veridical.
The input that was categorized by Dutch listeners
as /E/, or the input that was categorized by
Japanese listeners as /l/, indeed contacts the
lexical entries that are supposed to contain these
phonemes (pencil, locker) and not the entries that
are supposed to contain the other members of
these phonemic contrasts (e.g., panda, rocket).
Why is this surprising? Of course, it would not
be at all surprising for a native listener to achieve
the same—hear pen-, and map it to pen or pencil
and absolutely not to pan or panda, or hear lock-
and map it to lock or locker and absolutely not to
rock or rocket. But how have the L2 listeners
managed to do it? If the input tends to be
Figure 3. Eye-tracking data for Dutch listeners given the same
visual display as that in Figure 2, but spoken instructions such as
click on the pencil; fixation proportions across time for the target
picture (pencil) and the competitor picture (panda). Based on
results from Weber and Cutler (2004).
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interpreted as the same thing whichever phoneme
is said (i.e., the listeners cannot hear the differ-
ence), how do they know to map the input to
one lexical entry and not to the other?
Clearly, the phonological representations for
/{/ and /r/ in these listeners’ lexicons are not
identical to the representations for /E/ and /l/,
and thus they are not contacted by the access rep-
resentations that successfully contact the lexical
representations with /E/ and /l/. Phonological
representations in the lexicon therefore cannot
be determined solely by the listeners’ experience
with spoken input. In the case of the nondomi-
nant member of the L2 pair (/{/ for Dutch lis-
teners, /r/ for Japanese listeners), the lexical
listing does not accurately reflect the categoriz-
ation that results from exposure to the sound in
question in a spoken word. Instead, it reflects a
separate categorization, which, however, is one
that the listeners usually do not come up with.
The process of contacting the lexical
representations of these words is thus an interest-
ing topic for study, and varying interpretations of
the process are possible (see Cutler et al., 2006,
for discussion of this point).
Another interesting issue is the range of poten-
tial factors that can modulate the information from
auditory perception in establishing phonological
representations in the lexicon. As noted above,
L2 learners have a variety of knowledge sources
to draw on, beyond the information they receive
in the spoken forms of words. At least explicit pro-
nunciation instruction, orthographic represen-
tation, and form familiarity would seem to offer
potential information about whether stored pho-
nological representations should be the same or
different, and possibly L2 learners draw on more
than one such source. In a clever follow-up to
Weber and Cutler’s (2004) study, Escudero,
Hayes-Harb, and Mitterer (2008) taught Dutch
speakers of English the supposed English names
for some nonsense figures, including pairs like
Figure 4. Eye-tracking data (fixation proportions across time for target picture and competitor picture) for Japanese listeners given a visual
display containing inter alia a locker and a rocket; (a) for spoken instructions such as click on the rocket (target¼ rocket, competitor¼ locker),
(b) for spoken instructions such as click on the locker (target ¼ locker, competitor¼ rocket). Based on results from Cutler, Weber, and Otake
(2006).
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tanzer and tendik, which differed in much the same
way as panda and pencil. When the nonsense
names were taught using only the spoken forms,
the two were confused equally often with each
other in a subsequent test with eye-tracking;
the instruction look at the tan- produced
about the same proportion of looks to the tanzer
as to the tendik, and so did the instruction look
at the ten-. These listeners could not tell the
vowels apart and treated the two initial syllables
as versions of the same syllable. When the non-
sense names were taught using the spelled as well
as the spoken form, however, the eye-tracking
results were quite different: The instruction look
at the tan- produced looks to the tendik as well
as the tanzer, but the instruction look at the ten-
led the listeners to look overwhelmingly at the
tendik only. This is exactly the same result as
Weber and Cutler had observed. Thus the
additional orthographic information enabled
these listeners to realize that the vowels were sup-
posed to be different and hence to incorporate
differences in the first syllables in their stored rep-
resentations of the novel words, in just the same
way as they did for known English words such as
pan and panda versus pen and pencil. But just as
with real English input, the availability of a
lexical distinction did not suffice to induce a corre-
sponding sensitivity in the listeners’ prelexical
phonetic processing.
The lesson to be drawn for present purposes
concerns the nondeterministic relationship of pho-
nological processing at the prelexical level and
phonological representations at the lexical level;
the two are, at least to a large extent, indepen-
dently determined. Listeners use abstract knowl-
edge about phonological distinctions, derived for
instance from orthography, to shape the stored
phonological forms; once they know there is sup-
posed to be a distinction between two phonemes,
they store the distinction, even if they can’t reliably
hear it. This is very easy to see in the L2 case,
because the phonemic confusions involved are pre-
dictable from the L1–L2 mapping. But there is no
reason in principle why the independence should
not be equally great in the L1 case. It is only in
infancy, in the very earliest stages of word learning,
that we are necessarily confined to using only
spoken traces of the word forms; as soon as we
can interact with others, we are open to explicit
instruction and hence to the exploitation of other
sources of information about words. Once we
learn to read, the possibilities expand further.
Many words that educated adults know have
been learned from reading and may indeed never
have been heard (sometimes even with the result
that the stored phonological form is quite incor-
rect). The lexical representations that language
users draw on are richly supplied with phonologi-
cal information, only some of which has been
drawn from prelexical processing of speech input.
The necessity of abstract prelexical
representations
Now consider the nature of this prelexical proces-
sing and the representations it involves. As noted
in the introduction, models of speech processing
traditionally assumed that these representations
were relatively abstract. A process of normalization
rids speech input of all its speaker- and situation-
specific properties, leaving over only the commu-
nicative essence in some phonetic form. A range
of phenomena has been ascribed to such abstrac-
tion, from interpretation of variant forms of
words (postman versus pos’man, film versus fillum)
as the same canonical lexical form (Donselaar,
Kuijpers, & Cutler, 1999; Sumner & Samuel,
2005) to different effects of phoneme transition
probability on the processing of spoken words
and nonwords (Vitevitch, 2003; Vitevitch &
Luce, 1998). The ease with which listeners can
deal with speech from talkers whose voices they
have never previously heard has always been one
of the strongest motivations for the classical
model. Indeed, our subjective experience is that
understanding an utterance from a new talker—
for instance, when a stranger in the street asks
for directions, or a shopkeeper names a price—is
usually no harder than understanding the same
utterance from a speaker whose voice is familiar
to us.
However, recent evidence for talker-familiarity
effects in spoken-word recognition has motivated
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some quite different approaches. It appears that
hearing a word spoken a second time by the
same speaker can result in easier recognition than
hearing a word spoken a second time but by a
different speaker—at least, if the task is to decide
whether the word had been heard before
(Goldinger, 1996; Luce & Lyons, 1998) or to
identify words against a noisy background
(Mullennix, Pisoni, & Martin, 1989; Nygaard,
Sommers, & Pisoni, 1994). Such evidence
prompted the development of models in which
traces of every speech input experience are
stored, and in some of these models the necessity
of any abstraction at all is queried. This radical
step is not a good idea, though; there is abundant
evidence that spoken-language recognition necess-
arily involves abstract prelexical representations,
separate from the representations of words. This
section describes some of this evidence.
Perceptual learning effects in phoneme perception
Among the speaker-specific properties of speech
signals is variation in phoneme realization. Some
speakers produce particular phonemes in an
unusual way—for example, with a lisp, or a
foreign accent. Experience tells us that unusual
phonemic realizations are sometimes initially pro-
blematic, but adaptation to a deviant pronunciation
can be extremely rapid. Norris, McQueen, and
Cutler (2003) developed a two-stage procedure
for inducing such adaptation. Participants in
their study first took part in an auditory lexical
decision experiment. A total of 20 words among
the items of this experiment contained a
phoneme the pronunciation of which had been
manipulated, so that it fell approximately halfway
between the speaker’s natural /s/ and natural /f/.
The phoneme was spliced into words where it
replaced either /s/ or /f/. For some participants,
/f/ was replaced by the ambiguous phoneme; so
they heard 20 words like loaf or enough or hand-
kerchief, each ending with the deviant phoneme
instead of a natural /f/ (note that although these
are English examples, the experiment was actually
in Dutch). They also heard 20 words with a clear
/s/ in final position, such as lace or carcase or
numerous, and 160 other words and nonwords
none of which contained any /f/ or /s/. Other
participants heard the 20 /s/-words (lace, etc.)
ending with the deviant phoneme, while the /f/-
words (loaf, etc.) were heard in their natural pro-
nunciation; otherwise, the lexical decision exper-
iment was the same for both these groups. The
first group of participants thus should learn that
this speaker pronounces /f/ in an odd way, while
the second group should learn that it is /s/ that
it is oddly pronounced; in either case, the listeners
should adapt to the deviant pronunciation.
They certainly did, as the results of the second
part of the experiment showed. In the second part,
the listeners performed a phonetic categorization
task, in which they heard vowel–consonant sylla-
bles and decided whether the consonant was /f/
or /s/. The consonant varied along a continuum
from a form close to a good /f/ to a form close
to a good /s/. Typically responses in such an
experiment show a categorical function – in the
early part of the continuum the percentage of
choices for one category is high, then there is a
rapid cross-over to a low percentage for that cat-
egory in the later part. The function for continu-
ous sounds such as vowels or, in this case,
fricatives, is less categorical (i.e., has a less steep
cross-over) than the function for discontinuous
sounds such as stop consonants, but still shows a
clear progression from one category choice to
the other. A shift in the boundary between the
two categories typically shifts the function to the
left or the right in the middle range of the
continuum (but does not affect the end points,
which are still clearly assigned to the one or the
other category).
Norris et al.’s (2003) phonetic categorization
test was quite short and omitted the end points;
it included five ambiguous sounds varying in close-
ness to /f/ and /s/. Results from their Experiment
2 are shown in Figure 5. The two middle functions
are results from two control groups of subjects,
who had heard nonwords containing the same
ambiguous sound as the groups described above
had heard in real words. One control group had
heard the ambiguous nonwords plus the /s/-
words such as lace, while the other control group
had heard the ambiguous nonwords plus the /f/-
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words such as loaf. As Figure 5 showed, this differ-
ence did not significantly affect their responses.
But the two experimental groups who had heard
the ambiguous sound in the context of real
words certainly showed a significant difference in
their response patterns. The group that had
learned that this sound was to be interpreted as
/f/ produced more /f/ responses across most of
the continuum; the group that had learned that
this sound was to be interpreted as /s/ produced
fewer /f/ responses. Thus their responses were
affected not just for the single ambiguous sound
heard in the first phase, but across a range of the
continuum, consistent with a shift in the boundary
between their /f/ and /s/ categories. The learning
concerned not a specific acoustic form, but the
relation between these abstract categories. The
direction in which the boundary shifted was then
different for each group, consistent with
adaptation to the differing identities that they
had been trained to allot to the ambiguous sound.
In Norris et al.’s (2003) study, the appearance of
the adaptation was dependent upon the availability
of lexically provided information about how the
ambiguous sound should be interpreted.
Listeners did not alter their phonetic categoriz-
ations after being exposed to a deviant pronuncia-
tion in nonwords, even though they could perhaps
have deduced the putative identity of the strange
sound from distributional information in the
remaining items (e.g., the clear /s/ in words like
lace would suggest that the sound was not /s/).
The lexical training, however, was extremely effec-
tive and notably rapid; hearing a deviant realiz-
ation of one phoneme in just 20 words was
enough to induce listeners to shift the boundaries
between that phoneme and a neighbour. Later
research showed that even then, Norris et al. had
overestimated the number of training exposures
necessary; in a study by Kraljic and Samuel
(2006) 10 exposure words proved sufficient to
induce a significant shift. Lexical decision, which
demands attention to the word’s form to enable
the decision that, say, word is a word but worb is
not, is also not a necessary precondition for induc-
tion of the effect; when the words occurred in a
story (Eisner & McQueen, 2006), the shift was
just as robust. The phonemes in that story
occurred in different positions in the words, so a
constant position was also unnecessary, and even
if position in the word is kept constant during
training, the perceptual learning can transfer at
test to occurrences of the same phoneme in a
different position (Jesse & McQueen, 2007).
Further, induction of a shift was also just as
robust if the words did not have to be processed
as words at all, but listeners merely tallied how
many words they heard (McQueen, Norris, &
Cutler, 2006c). Lexical information is not the
only type of information that listeners can use for
such learning—visual speech cues will also do the
trick (Bertelson, Vroomen, & de Gelder, 2003).
Perceptual learning as speaker adaptation
If the way that we adapt speech perception to indi-
vidual speakers involves perceptual learning of this
Figure 5. Phoneme categorization data after perceptual learning
for an ambiguous phoneme realization: Proportion of /f/
responses after hearing the ambiguous sound replacing /f/ in
words (as in loaf), replacing /s/ in words (as in lace), in
nonwords with contrasting words containing /s/, or in nonwords
with contrasting words containing /f/. Based on results from
Norris et al. (2003).
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kind, then a few entailments obviously follow.
First, the adaptation that appears in a learning
experiment of the sort just described should be
confined to the case of speech from a particular
speaker, speaking a particular dialect. It would
not be helpful to generalize too widely. After all,
if we are chatting with a group of Scottish
friends, and a speaker with a Birmingham accent
joins the conversation, adaptation to Brummy
phoneme settings will help for input from that
speaker, but is likely to be counterproductive if
applied when the Scots are talking. Eisner and
McQueen (2005) tested the speaker specificity of
the adaptation by training listeners with lexical
decision items spoken by one talker and testing
with a phonetic continuum from another talker.
There was no adaptation in that case. If,
however, the fricative continuum came from the
same talker even though the participants were
unaware of this (because it had been inserted
into speech from another talker), the adaptation
was observed. Note that fricatives encode
speaker-specific information quite effectively, so
listeners can easily restrict the adaptation to a
specific talker’s speech. Kraljic and Samuel
(2007) showed that it is possible to train listeners
to construct speaker-specific fricative represen-
tations concurrently for more than one talker
in these experiments. In contrast to fricatives,
stop consonants do not vary as much across
speakers, and Kraljic and Samuel (2006, 2007)
found that adaptation for word-medial /d/ or
/t/ (e.g., in academic, cafeteria) did generalize
across speakers, albeit with an effect size much
smaller than the effect size that they had observed
for fricatives.
Second, it is clearly a prerequisite of adaptation
to talkers that it should last. Ideally, knowledge
about characteristic articulatory idiosyncrasy
should remain helpful the next time we meet the
same person. This is also indeed the case. Kraljic
and Samuel (2005) found that the perceptual
learning lasts for 25 minutes in a laboratory
testing session filled with other tasks; Eisner and
McQueen (2006) found that it lasts for 12 hours,
irrespective of whether those hours were mainly
filled with sleep or were daytime hours filled
with normal daytime activities. What can effec-
tively and quickly reduce the adaptation is
hearing the same talker produce nondeviant rendi-
tions of the same phoneme. Clear productions by
another talker have no effect, but a clear version
by the person responsible for the apparently
deviant production abolishes the phoneme bound-
ary shift right away (Kraljic & Samuel, 2005). This
too is just as required: If a friend has a cold, we
want to be able to understand the modified
speech, but we want to be able to adapt back
right away once the nasal congestion has passed.
Note that if listeners acquire evidence that a
deviant articulation is not due to speaker-specific
idiosyncrasy, but is a dialectal feature restricted
to a single phonetic context (Kraljic, Brennan, &
Samuel, 2008a), or is caused by a transient state
such as speaking with a pen in the mouth
(Kraljic, Samuel, & Brennan, 2008b), they do
not adjust phoneme boundaries; the prerequisite
of adaptation is that the deviant pronunciation is
indeed likely to be encountered in the same
talker’s future utterances.
Third, and most importantly, the adaptation
should generalize beyond the lexical items
involved in the training situation. Otherwise it
would be useless. Our experience is that when
we adapt to a new talker, we understand whatever
that talker says even though we have no stored
memories of those particular words from that
talker. So hearing someone pronounce /f/ in an
odd way in loaf, carafe, and handkerchief should
help us understand the same person’s later pronun-
ciations of, say, dwarf or hoof. Likewise, it should
enable us to distinguish between potential
minimal pairs—for instance, to know that an
utterance of knife is not nice. This would obviously
not occur if learning is specific to the particular
utterances that have been heard.
Generalization to other words would imply
that, as argued above, the learning is happening
at a truly abstract level; it concerns phonemic cat-
egories, independently of the forms in which they
might be encountered.
McQueen, Cutler, and Norris (2006a) have
established that generalization to other words
does indeed occur. They combined adaptation,
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induced using the training conditions of Norris
et al. (2003), with a lexical test phase to assess
whether the adaptation had generalized. The
training involved, again, an f/s continuum, with
half the subjects learning that the ambiguous
sound was /f/ and the other half learning that it
was /s/; the test phase made use of minimal
pairs of the knife/nice kind. The same utterance,
ending with the same ambiguous sound, should
be recognized as an utterance of knife by the listen-
ers who had been trained that the ambiguous
sound was /f/, but it should be recognized as
nice by the other group, who had been trained to
identify the ambiguous sound as /s/. To deter-
mine which word the listeners had recognized,
McQueen et al. employed the cross-modal identity
priming paradigm, which, as we saw above, tests
for activation of a phonological representation in
the lexicon. A spoken prime that was a potential
minimal pair was presented, with the ambiguous
sound replacing its final phoneme. If such a
prime is recognized as knife, then it will facilitate
responses to visually presented KNIFE (but
will not facilitate NICE). This is the pattern
we would predict for subjects with /f/-biased
training. For subjects with /s/-biased training
we would predict the opposite: The prime should
be recognized as nice, and it will facilitate
responses to visually presented NICE but not
KNIFE.
Figure 6 summarizes the results of their study.
The priming effect when the target word was con-
sistent with the interpretation of the prime
induced by the training (KNIFE given /f/ train-
ing, NICE given /s/ training) is compared with
the priming effect when the target word was
inconsistent with the training-induced interpret-
ation (KNIFE given /s/ training, NICE given
/f/ training). Clearly, responses to targets consist-
ent with the interpretation are significantly facili-
tated, while responses to inconsistent targets are
not facilitated at all.
Thus the shift in a phonemic category’s bound-
ary induced by a short training session involving 20
words has the desired consequences: It generalizes
more or less immediately across the lexicon such
that perception of any word involving that
phoneme is appropriately adjusted. This generaliz-
ation has since been replicated, with a different
ambiguous sound in the training condition, by
Sjerps (2007), who also established that the
strength of the posttraining priming by words
with the ambiguous sound was indistinguishable
from that of the priming by naturally spoken
tokens of the same words.
The generalization, to words in which the
trained sound occurs in new phonetic contexts,
implies that the learning has occurred at a level
involving phonemic representations—abstract
forms standing for the sound that is common to
carafe, handkerchief, and knife, and indeed to fate,
fresh, office, and muffle as well. A model that
denies all abstraction and confines stored represen-
tations to the traces of already-experienced
episodes cannot account for this finding.
MINERVA-2 (Hintzman, 1986), as used by
Goldinger (1998) in his model of lexical access,
is such a model; Cutler, Eisner, McQueen,
and Norris (in press) attempted to model the
perceptual learning and generalization in an
implementation of this model, but it in fact pre-
dicted the opposite pattern of results from that
revealed in the McQueen et al. (2006a)
experiment.
Figure 6. Cross-modal identity priming effects (difference from
control prime condition) of spoken prime words ambiguous
between minimal pairs such as knife/nice, for visual target words
consistent with the trained interpretation of the ambiguous final
phoneme (KNIFE after /f/ training, NICE after /s/ training)
versus inconsistent with it (KNIFE after /s/ training, NICE
after /f/ training). Based on results from McQueen et al. (2006a).
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Conclusion
The new findings summarized here constrain the
structure of speech-processing models. Human lis-
teners make use of separate representations of
incoming speech at a prelexical level and at a
lexical level. The prelexical representations are
abstract, requiring matching abstraction in the
lexicon. Within the lexicon, the representations
of word form and word meaning dissociate. The
form representations in the lexicon are not fully
determined by phonetic processing of speech
input, but are also shaped by abstract knowledge
of contrastive distinctions.
Some of these constraints (dissociable form and
meaning representations in the lexicon; the inde-
pendence of lexical form representations from pre-
lexical processing) are novel, while others
(abstraction; the separation of prelexical and
lexical processing) are features of what has been
referred to in preceding sections as “traditional”
or “classical” psycholinguistic approaches to
speech perception. Both abstraction and prelexi-
cal/lexical separation have been called into ques-
tion by approaches based on episodic memory
(e.g., Goldinger, 1998), but without them, such
approaches are inadequate. (This is not news to
the proponents of episodic models. Researchers
with considerable episodic track records have
recently called for hybrid approaches combining
abstract and episodic information: Goldinger,
2007; Pisoni & Levy, 2007.) In any case, it is
clear that models that deny a role for abstraction
at any or all of the levels of human speech percep-
tion distinguished here, or which fail to acknowl-
edge the separation of these processing levels, must
be discarded.
The functional significance of abstract rep-
resentations is substantial; abstraction and gener-
alization play a major role in the efficiency of
cognitive processing in general and speech proces-
sing in particular. Without abstraction, it would
not be possible to adapt quickly to newly encoun-
tered talkers; communication would be a much
slower and more errorful affair. Note that the
capacity to retune perceptual category decisions is
not specific to language—analogous retuning
occurs, for instance, for colour categories
(Mitterer & De Ruiter, 2008). Nor, within
language, is it specific to speech—it operates in
just the same way for an ambiguous letter
in print (e.g., a letter that could be H or N, but
is disambiguated by appearing at the end of
WEIG- or of REIG-; Norris, Butterfield,
McQueen, & Cutler, 2006a). Within speech, the
knowledge that is drawn upon in interpreting an
ambiguous sound need not be lexical; it can be,
for example, constraints on permissible phoneme
sequences, processed in nonwords (e.g., a sound
that could be /f/ or /s/ is interpreted as /f/ if it
precedes -rumic and as /s/ if it precedes -nuter,
because the sequences /sr/ and /fn/ are illegal in
English; Cutler, McQueen, Butterfield, &
Norris, 2008). Decisions about abstract category
membership permeate all domains of cognitive
processing, and these similar effects across mul-
tiple domains suggest the involvement of a power-
ful general learning mechanism aimed at
improving the efficiency of such category decisions
by rapid reference to whatever meaningful knowl-
edge is available.
There is much more to be said about the com-
plete account of human speech processing.
Integrating abstract representation and stored epi-
sodic information in a single model is a challenge,
and there is as yet little directly relevant evidence
(though see, for example, McLennan, Luce, &
Charles-Luce, 2003, for an argument that while
episodic representations may be drawn upon in
easier speech-processing tasks, more difficult
tasks require the availability of abstract represen-
tations). But this is far from the only challenge.
The evidence for abstract representation must
also be integrated with the evidence for continu-
ous cascade of graded information across the
levels at which speech is processed (see
McQueen, Dahan, & Cutler, 2003, for a
review). Here the future may lie with probabilistic
accounts such as the Bayesian model of spoken-
word recognition recently proposed by Norris
and McQueen (2008). Further, it is characteristic
of human listeners (though presumably not of
dogs or monkeys) that the nature and course of
operations at each level of processing is shaped
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by the mother tongue. Listeners’ phonemic rep-
resentations are determined by what phonemes
contrast in the native language, and their lexical
representations by what words are found in the
native vocabulary; but even beyond this, there
are processing effects at every level. Thus the
size and make-up of the phoneme inventory can
cause differences in how one and the same con-
trast between two speech sounds is processed
across languages; although /f/ and /s/ (as in
leaf– lease) are articulated in the same way in
Spanish, English, Dutch, and Italian, listeners
attend to transitional cues in a preceding vowel
to distinguish /f/ from /s/ in Spanish and in
English, but not in Dutch or Italian, the reason
being that the former two languages have the
additional similar sound /T/ (as in teeth), but
the latter two do not (Wagner, Ernestus, &
Cutler, 2006). Likewise, the distribution of
sounds in the phoneme inventory determines
how sensitive listeners are to one and the same
source of variation; in languages with large
numbers of both vowels and consonants, such as
English, French, or Dutch, listeners are equally
sensitive to effects of vowel variation on consonant
realization and vice versa, but in languages with a
highly asymmetric inventory, such as Spanish with
four times as many consonants as vowels,
listeners are far more sensitive to consonantal
effects on vowels than the reverse (Costa, Cutler,
& Sebastia´n-Galle´s, 1998). The structure of the
lexicon also influences whether or not
listeners pay attention to one and the same
source of acoustic evidence, such as suprasegmen-
tal cues to stress, which are attended to in the
activation of words in Dutch (Donselaar, Koster,
& Cutler, 2005) and Spanish (Soto-Faraco,
Sebastia´n-Galle´s, & Cutler, 2001), but are
largely disregarded in English (Cooper, Cutler,
& Wales, 2002). A complete account of speech
processing will thus need to map the range of
language-specific modulations of the language-
independent substrate. The representations are,
therefore, just one part of the story; however,
they are an important part, and in constraining
our account of the representations involved, we
certainly come closer to a fuller understanding
of one of humankind’s favourite cognitive oper-
ations: listening to speech.
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